Fighting Fraud and Corruption Locally

A strategy for the 2020s
A response to economic crime and fraud
This is the third Fighting Fraud and Corruption Locally Strategy, produced by local government for local government.
Content

03  Foreword
Local Government Association
Joint Fraud Taskforce

05  Executive Summary
Review of 2016 Strategy
Introduction

10  The Context

20  The Strategic Approach
GAPPP
The themes

25  Turning Strategy into Action
The Local Response
Appendix 1 & Appendix 2
Since the first strategy was produced in 2011 councils have faced significant financial challenges. Councils have innovated, collaborated and prioritised in order to meet the financial challenge and to protect front line services. Tackling the threat of fraud and corruption has been and continues to be a cornerstone of protecting council finances and enabling them to maximise the value of every pound spent on behalf of local residents.

Every pound siphoned off by a fraudster is a pound that cannot be spent on services where they are needed. Councils need to be vigilant. Councils have a good record in countering fraud and the strategy contains numerous case studies and examples of successes.

As the strategy highlights, it is estimated that about one in three of all crimes committed nationally is fraud based and fraudsters are always seeking new ways to take money. The strategy also highlights that potential losses to fraud could run into hundreds of millions or even billions of pounds if preventative action is not taken. Councils need to be agile and work together with national agencies and the Government to respond to new fraud threats, to prevent losses and to protect vulnerable people in our society. Collaboration to counter and prevent fraud is a theme running through the strategy.

The Fighting Fraud and Corruption Locally Strategy is an excellent example of how councils can come together for the overall benefit of local services and residents served. The strategy has been led by the Fighting Fraud and Corruption Locally Board. This Board has been described as “a coalition of the willing”. It is a group of senior multi-disciplinary experts from councils working together with partners, that work with the councils on counter fraud activities. The Board is currently chaired by a representative from the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives (SOLACE). The Board members and the organisations they come from all provide their expertise on a pro bono basis, for the benefit of the sector and to help counter fraud. The board is supported by the LGA. In carrying out the research to draft this new strategy, the board has run several workshops up and down the country that have been attended by representatives from more than 250 councils. The work of all these people is reflected in the strategy and our thanks are due to all of them.

The strategy outlines a governance framework for continuing national and regional collaboration on counter fraud under the Fighting Fraud and Corruption Locally umbrella. Section four of the strategy outlines a practical programme and checklist for individual councils to follow.

I am happy to endorse this strategy on behalf of the LGA and welcome it as an opportunity for councils to review and further improve their counter fraud work in the 2020s.

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Cllr Richard Watts
Chair Resources Board, Local Government Association
Leader Islington Council
As the Chair of the Joint Fraud Taskforce I am delighted to support The Fighting Fraud and Corruption Locally 2020 strategy at a time when incidences of fraud and corruption are rising and there is an identified need for councils and their leaders to adopt a robust response.

Having worked as a fraud investigator I understand the importance of collaborative working and of having a structure and framework that guides and governs counter fraud and associated corruption activities.

Through working together and applying the principles of this strategy I am convinced that, perhaps for the first time, we have a model for true collaboration that is so important in identifying fraudsters, often organised groups, who seek to undermine and take financial advantage of systemic vulnerabilities and abuse those citizens in our community who are in themselves vulnerable.

I recognise the challenge that we all face in having to balance demands on resource across essential services at a time when funding is constrained. However, I also recognise the important role that local authorities and their frontline services play in tackling fraud and corruption that are a drain on those resources. Savings through enforcement and bringing fraudsters to justice can be used to support our social services and can build stronger and safer communities.

I am convinced that this strategy is an important step in tackling fraud and corruption that is so corrosive to society. In my role as Chair of the Joint Fraud Taskforce I welcome my local authority colleagues. By working together, I am convinced that we can deliver a step change in tackling fraud.

Mike Haley
Chair of the Joint Fraud Taskforce

The Joint Fraud Taskforce is a partnership between banks, law enforcement and government to deal with economic crime.
Executive Summary

Fighting Fraud and Corruption Locally 2020 is the updated counter fraud and corruption strategy for local government. It provides a blueprint for a coordinated response to fraud and corruption perpetrated against local authorities with the support of those at the top.

Local authorities continue to face a significant fraud challenge and while the official figures are dated the argument about protecting funds and vulnerable people remains. The National Fraud Authority estimated local authorities face the threat of £2.1bn fraud in a year in 2013. In fact, the Annual Fraud Indicator produced by Crowe Clark Whitehill estimates that figure may be as high as £7.8bn in 2017, out of a total of £40.4bn for the public sector as a whole. The Government’s Economic Crime Plan states that the numbers of fraud offences rose by 12% during 2018 to 3.6 million – constituting a third of all crimes in the UK.

Every £1 that a local authority loses to fraud is £1 that it cannot spend on supporting the community. Fraud and corruption are a drain on local authority resources and can lead to reputational damage and the repercussions maybe far reaching.

Fraudsters are constantly revising and sharpening their techniques and local authorities need to do the same. There is a clear need for a tough stance supported by elected members, chief executives and those charged with governance. This includes tackling cross-boundary and organised fraud and corruption attempts, as well as addressing new risks such as social care fraud and cyber issues.

In addition to the scale of losses and potential losses, there are further challenges arising from changes in the wider public sector landscape including budget reductions, service remodelling and integration, and government policy changes. Local authorities report that they are still encountering barriers to tackling fraud effectively, including lack of incentives, data sharing, information sharing and powers, but also that they require support from senior stakeholders and those in charge of governance.

These factors do present challenges. However, this strategy demonstrates the tenacity of local fraud teams in continuing to lead on innovation and collaborate and also that there is a network of local leaders willing to support this initiative. This strategy, then, is about creating a self-sustaining counter fraud response for the sector.

By using this strategy local authorities will:

- develop and maintain a culture in which fraud and corruption are unacceptable
- understand the harm that fraud can do in the community
- understand their fraud risk
- prevent fraud more effectively
- use technology to improve their response
- share information and resources more effectively
- better detect fraud loss
- bring fraudsters to account more quickly and efficiently
- improve the recovery of losses
- protect those at risk.

This strategy is aimed at council leaders, chief executives, finance directors and all those charged with governance in local authorities including those on audit committees and with portfolio responsibility. It is produced as part of the Fighting Fraud and Corruption Locally initiative, a partnership between local authorities and key stakeholders, and succeeds the previous strategies written in 2011 and 2016. It is not ‘owned’ by any one organisation but by the local authorities who have given time and support to develop it. Areas of focus for elected members, chief executives and those charged with governance are laid out in Section 4: The Local Response.

This partnership has been so successful it has existed since 2010 when the research and engagement first began.
The previous two strategies focused upon pillars of activity that summarised the areas local authorities should concentrate efforts on. These were ‘acknowledge’, ‘prevent’ and ‘pursue’.

These pillars are still applicable. During the research for this strategy they were supported as key areas by those who have input. However, another two areas of activity have emerged that underpin tenets of those pillars. These are ‘govern’ and ‘protect’.

The pillar of ‘govern’ sits before ‘acknowledge’. It is about ensuring the tone from the top and should be included in local counter fraud strategies.

**Govern**
Having robust arrangements and executive support to ensure anti-fraud, bribery and corruption measures are embedded throughout the organisation. Having a holistic approach to tackling fraud is part of good governance.

**Acknowledge**
Acknowledging and understanding fraud risks and committing support and resource to tackling fraud in order to maintain a robust anti-fraud response.

**Prevent**
Preventing and detecting more fraud by making better use of information and technology, enhancing fraud controls and processes and developing a more effective anti-fraud culture.

**Pursue**
Punishing fraudsters and recovering losses by prioritising the use of civil sanctions, developing capability and capacity to investigate fraudsters and developing a more collaborative and supportive local enforcement response.

Local authorities have achieved success by following this approach; however, they now need to respond to an increased threat and protect themselves and the community.

The second new area that has appeared during the research recognises the increased risks to victims and the local community:

**Protect**
Protecting against serious and organised crime, protecting individuals from becoming victims of crime and protecting against the harm that fraud can do to the community.

For a local authority this will also cover protecting public funds, protecting its organisation from fraud and cybercrime and also protecting itself from future frauds.
This strategy and its tools provide ways for local authorities to further develop and enhance their counter fraud response by ensuring that it is comprehensive and effective and by focusing on the key changes that will make the most difference.

Local authorities can ensure that their counter fraud response is comprehensive and effective by considering their performance against each of the six themes – the six Cs – that emerged from the 2016 research:

— Culture
— Capability
— Competence
— Capacity
— Communication
— Collaboration

Many local authorities have demonstrated that they can innovate to tackle fraud and can collaborate effectively to meet the challenges. Indeed, many have identified that a reduction in fraud can be a source of sizeable savings. There are case studies and quotes through this document evidencing the good work that is already happening.

This strategy

• recognises that fraud is not a victimless crime and seeks to protect the vulnerable from the harm that fraud can cause in the community

• calls upon senior management in local authorities to demonstrate that they are committed to tackling fraud and corruption

• calls upon local authorities to continue to tackle fraud with the dedication they have shown so far and to step up the fight against fraud in a challenging and rapidly changing environment

• calls upon local authorities to work together to illustrate the benefits that can accrue from fighting fraud more effectively

• calls upon senior stakeholders to listen to the business cases on barriers put by local authorities in order to promote counter fraud activity in local authorities by ensuring the right further financial incentives are in place and helping them break down barriers such as a lack of powers.
Case Study
Birmingham City Council: Acknowledge
Using data to tackle fraud

In the original Fighting Fraud Locally 2011 Birmingham City Council was cited as good practice for setting up a data warehouse and protecting public funds. BCC continues to put fraud at the top of the agenda.

BCC has used a well-established, sophisticated data warehouse to develop an automated programme of data matching that allows potential fraud and error to be detected within 24 hours. This has been particularly effective in identifying fraudulent claims for council tax single person discounts and fraudulent housing applications. In time BCC expects the process to reduce the amount of fraud or error requiring a formal investigation as it will have been prevented or stopped almost as soon as it began. As a result, services that are being provided incorrectly can be stopped quickly, thus helping to preserve resources and reduce the level of fraud and error.

“Local authorities must ensure they take the necessary steps to put in place a strategy which can deliver a response that protects itself and its residents. Councils need to commit adequate resources to support that work and also measure its progress against that strategy. Fighting Fraud and Corruption Locally provides the necessary tools and ideas to support that work.”

Trevor Scott, Chief Executive Wealden District Council
Introduction

This strategy document is aimed primarily at council leaders and other elected members, chief executives, finance directors and those charged with governance in local authorities.

As a result of lessons learned during previous incarnations this document contains the core strategy together with companion documents which provide more detailed guidance on its implementation which will be updated when necessary during the life of this strategy. In that way there will be live documents for practitioners to draw upon that will more readily reflect the ever changing fraud local landscape.

We recognise that pulling together practitioners and stakeholders to discuss these issues is a local authority exercise and detracts from day-to-day activity where there are limited resources in place. Therefore this strategy will cover from 2020 onwards supported by live companion documents.

The research for this strategy was carried out by local practitioners and board members.

The research was commissioned by the board and was coordinated by the secretariat.

The research consisted of:

**RESEARCH**
- Desktop research of publications, legislation, and current activity in the landscape.

**INTERVIEWS**
- Individual interviews and discussions with stakeholders from the counter fraud community.

**EXPERTS**
- Specific interviews with subject matters experts.

**WORKSHOPS**
- Facilitated discussions at FFCL 2019 Conference, thirteen specific workshops across UK and two additional conference workshops.

The original Fighting Fraud Locally 2011 strategy was launched with a series of pilots and joint working, conferences and awards and was hugely successful. The workshops highlighted much work being done in local authorities that is commendable and can prevent fraud across boundaries. Therefore, as part of these fact-finding engagement exercises those that attended workshops were asked to offer activity to demonstrate the partnership as part of FFCL. Around 30 activities and events have been identified for 2020 that demonstrate some of the good practice found during the research for this document and show that local authorities continue to tackle fraud and corruption. It is intended that these examples will be used to kick-start momentum in the way that the 2011 strategy did. In addition a number of working groups have formed already to implement the recommendations.

The activity following the publication of FFCL 2016 was more limited. There was no formal local launch and limited board activity. Therefore some of the issues raised during that research still persist. Efforts have been made to redress this during the research for this strategy by setting in place activity to address those persistent issues.

Nevertheless it is clear that local authorities continue to tackle fraud, as evidenced in this strategy’s case studies and by the appetite to take forward the issues raised during the research and in the good practice guides.

Several new areas were raised during the research as barriers to overcome and local authorities have already stepped up to join together to help tackle these barriers. As part of the engagement exercise working groups and local authorities are already in place to begin the work on these issues.
Section 1: The Context

a) The scale of fraud and corruption

It is accepted that fraud affects the UK across all sectors and causes significant harm.

The Office for National Statistics states that one in 16 members of the population is likely to fall victims. The Government’s Economic Crime Plan 2019 states that the number of fraud offences rose by 12% during 2018 to 3.6 million – constituting a third of all crimes in the UK.

The last, most reliable and comprehensive set of local authority figures was published by the National Fraud Authority in 2013, and indicates that the fraud threat may have been costing the UK £52bn a year.

Within these figures the threat to local authorities totalled £2.1bn.

More recent estimates are higher. The Annual Fraud Indicator produced by Crowe Clark Whitehill estimated that figure may be as high as £7.8bn in 2017 of which procurement fraud was estimated as £4.3bn. This study estimated that the total threat faced by the public sector was £40.4bn.

“We do not have a wholly reliable estimate of the total scale of economic crime. However, all assessments within the public and private sectors indicate that the scale of the economic crime threat continues to grow.”

Economic Crime Plan 2019
The National Fraud Authority estimated public sector fraud (including local government) at £20.6bn in 2013.

The National Audit Office’s Local Landscape Review 2018 estimated fraud at up to £20.3bn excluding local government.

The estimated losses for local authorities in 2013 are broken down in the following by identified fraud losses and hidden fraud losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fraud Type</th>
<th>Estimated loss</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing tenancy fraud</td>
<td>£845m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement fraud</td>
<td>£876m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payroll Fraud</td>
<td>£154m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Tax fraud</td>
<td>£133m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Badge Scheme misuse</td>
<td>£46m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant fraud</td>
<td>£35m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension fraud</td>
<td>£7.1m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annual Fraud indicator 2013

These figures do not take into account the indirect costs of responding to and dealing with fraud and exclude some potentially significant areas of fraud loss. The fraud landscape has changed since 2013 as councils have introduced new ways of working and innovative responses to risks, while at the same time new areas of fraud risk have appeared.

Local authorities were sceptical about current publications on sector fraud figures and performance as there was a plethora of different numbers with no agreement or consensus. However, they remain keen to develop a consistent risk and performance methodology for the sector and for individual councils to estimate the potential risk they face on a consistent basis. Following the research for this strategy, a working group has been set up to develop methodologies for the sector to use.

b) The nature of the problem

In June 2019 the Government published its first Economic Crime Plan and included fraud and corruption in the definition.

The Government's Economic Crime Plan 2019

What is economic crime?
To help establish our partnership, we have agreed a common language across the public and private sectors regarding economic crime. We have used the following definition of economic crime to guide our efforts. Economic crime refers to a broad category of activity involving money, finance or assets, the purpose of which is to unlawfully obtain a profit or advantage for the perpetrator or cause loss to others. This poses a threat to the UK’s economy and its institutions and causes serious harm to society and individuals. It includes criminal activity which:

- allows criminals to benefit from the proceeds of their crimes or fund further criminality
- damages our financial system and harms the interests of legitimate business
- undermines the integrity of the UK’s position as an international financial centre
- poses a risk to the UK’s prosperity, national security and reputation

1.12 This definition is broader than terms such as ‘financial crime’ or ‘white-collar crime’ to provide a holistic response to the following types of criminality:

- fraud against the individual, private sector and public sector
- terrorist financing
- sanctions contravention
- market abuse
- corruption and bribery
- the laundering of proceeds of all crimes

For the purposes of this strategy we have retained the terms ‘fraud’ and ‘corruption’ while recognising that they are part of a wider agenda. The strategy has not been re-titled ‘Economic Crime’.
c) Issues raised by stakeholders

During the workshops and research a number of barriers to effective working were raised – the main issues raised are below. Participants were asked how they would solve these issues and there were many ideas and opportunities presented. Local authorities are keen to play a part and influence the outcomes. Therefore a working group has been set up for each of these areas to assess the evidence so far, collect any further evidence and to report into the secretariat for the FFCL Board to consider. There is evidence to create an FFCL operational group from the current FFCL representative network. Further detail on how this will operate will be in the live Delivery Annex.

Recommendation: A single regional FFCL operational group should be formed from the existing FFCL regional representatives.

Fraud measurement

While recognising that the repercussions of fraud are wider than financial it is important that councils have an up-to-date estimate of what the figures and areas of risk appear to be. There are a number of different methods of calculating fraud losses, and these vary across regions. Moreover the fraud priorities differ across regions. External organisations present figures to the sector but there is little or no ownership of these within local authorities. Local authority attendees raised this lack of independent analysis and free benchmarking to look at areas in deep detail rather than reported figures on numbers of referrals or cases detected. Local authorities could use this analysis to make the business case to tackle fraud, understand fraud issues more closely and see a more detailed picture across boundaries.

Recommendation: A working group on measurement should be formed to develop a consistent risk and performance methodology for the sector.

Local authorities have agreed to work together to build a set of figures for use as an indicator of actual losses, prevention measures and fraud areas. In addition this group will look at the area of benchmarking. This work is underway and the working group is now formed and is in place.

Powers

Local authorities welcomed the introduction of the Prevention of Social Housing Fraud Act (PSHFA) and reported that it had improved accessibility to information and intelligence.

However, some issues on powers that had been raised previously had not been taken forward by any parties, as the PSHFA, had and have been exacerbated by new fraud areas such as social care fraud where local authorities report it is difficult to obtain information. During the research local authorities have provided a number of examples across service areas where they cannot obtain information or access organisations in order to progress investigations.

There are a number of potential avenues to resolve these issues and local authorities have themselves suggested opportunities to resolve these. These issues need to be explored further to identify and evidence areas where lack of powers currently frustrate efforts by the sector to successfully progress counter fraud investigations. This will then enable the sector to lobby for the additional powers required.

Recommendation: A working group on powers should be formed.

Local authorities have agreed to work together to identify and evidence areas where lack of powers currently frustrate efforts by the sector to successfully progress counter fraud activity and identify what additional powers are required, what forms that should take and to examine the suggestions that have been collated. This evidence should then be used to lobby government to grant additional powers required. This recommendation is underway and the working group is now formed and is in place.

Incentives

Local authorities welcomed the Counter Fraud Fund in 2015 which had been distributed by the then Department for Communities and Local Government.

Case Study

An employee responsible for managing Ipswich Market and collecting stall rent from traders was prosecuted for theft of cash collected. The council’s finance team identified an irregularity when it attempted to reconcile income received to income due. The theft was valued at £33,376 and totalled 91 thefts. The employee was given an 18-month prison sentence suspended for two years and ordered to carry out 250 hours of unpaid work in the community.

He was also ordered to pay £14,000 compensation to Ipswich Borough Council at the rate of £400 a month.
This fund was a one-off and there were good results that are detailed on the Local Government Association Counter Fraud Hub page. However, many local authorities did not have the opportunity to bid and some had lost resources. Local authorities reported that they did not have funds to set up dedicated teams or undertake proactive work, and offers of technology were expensive and often duplicated existing offerings. Local authorities have made some suggestions about ways in which counter fraud activity may be funded. Local authorities have put together ideas on what types of incentives could support improved activity.

**Recommendation: A working group on incentives should be formed.**

Local authorities have agreed to work together to indicate where incentives may be required from Government and what forms they may take and to examine the suggestions that have been collated in the research.

The working group is now formed and is in place and the work is underway.

**Data analytics and matching**

A number of data related initiatives exist which local authorities may take part in for example, counter fraud hubs. At the majority of workshops it was said that there is inconsistent advice, high pricing, lack of discussion with suppliers and difficulty filtering out what is useful from what is not. The National Fraud Initiative has two products which were highlighted as useful and these are the Fraud Hub and AppCheck. It was also reported that there were issues with data quality, data standards and a lack of quality assurance about products.

**Recommendation: A working group should be formed to review existing data related initiatives available to local authorities and recommend best practice or new ideas.**

Local authorities have agreed to form a working group to look at the area of data. A number of ideas have been put together and the group will consider these and what further activity is required. This recommendation is underway and the working group is now formed and is in place.

**Social care issues**

At most workshops the area of social care fraud was raised. Social care fraud harms the community and vulnerable individuals who are unable to detect scams or fraud and are often unable to report them. Sometimes abuse of funds by family members or carers complicates the situation. This can include financial abuse of vulnerable persons, not just direct payments and personal budgets.

This area of fraud has emerged as a growing risk since the last strategy was published. The impact of this risk on already stretched social care services and budgets is potentially very significant. For this reason, organisations with relevant skills together with those local authorities that have developed good practice have offered to support work in this area of risk. Our research also highlighted a number of ideas about identifying and tackling some systemic vulnerabilities in this area. Local authorities should ensure fraud strategies are aligned with safeguarding responsibilities to ensure we actively protect the most vulnerable in our communities. Close working with social care teams will be required with joint approaches and planning.

**Recommendation: A working group on social care fraud should be formed to look at how local fraud strategies should align to local authorities’ safeguarding responsibilities as well as to identify best practice in countering risks relating to social care fraud.**

Local authorities have agreed to form a working group to look at the area of social care fraud. A number of ideas have been put together and the group will consider these and what further activity is required. This recommendation is underway and the working group is now formed and is in place.

“Investing to prevent fraud should be one of the early steps in building your counter fraud response. The repercussions of fraud can be far reaching. We have a duty to protect residents in our communities from fraud and we should work in collaboration with officers across the council and partner agencies to prevent fraud and safeguard the vulnerable. Fraud is not a victimless crime”.

Clive Palfreyman, Executive Director Finance & Resources
London Borough of Hounslow
d) The themes

In FFCL 2016 a number of themes were identified and while those are still relevant and supported during the research one in particular stood out: collaboration.

Collaboration

There is an appetite for collaboration across the sector and geographically. However, it does not apply solely to local authorities. There is a need for collaboration across sectors, local law enforcement and with suppliers and external organisations.

The current FFCL regional representatives’ network functions well. However, there is still a gap where information does not flow. There are also links to law enforcement and both national and local bodies which if they were stronger would help support the fight against fraud. Some councils already participate in regional bodies that could easily be better connected. There is overwhelming support for the idea of more formal FFCL-linked groups. Local authorities requested FFCL regional groups.

There is also the possibility of exploring the principle of placing an obligation on partner bodies to share information to assist the detection and prevention of fraud even if the fraud is not against the sharing body.

Furthermore, local authorities reported the need to be more formally linked into the national law enforcement bodies. During the research a number of issues and patterns appeared in workshops that have been raised with enforcement; this demonstrates the merits of a joined-up approach. The Chief Executive of Cifas currently chairs the Joint Fraud Taskforce as well as sitting on the FFCL board and this has enabled Cifas to raise issues with the National Economic Crime Centre about local authorities’ fraud risks. Local authorities requested support for better links to the major bodies in enforcement.

It was noted that where support was offered from outside the sector this could lead to a lack of ‘ownership’ by local authorities and that, had they been consulted or asked to contribute, products and services might have had better take-up. In particular, the cost of external support was raised several times as a barrier to take-up.

Recommendation: A single FFCL regional operational group should be created using the existing network that can link to relevant boards and enforcement.

Activity

During the workshops local authorities agreed to join the existing FFCL regional groups with a representative who is able to form part of a regional FFCL operational group supported by an FFCL Strategic Advisory Board (the current FFCL board).

The North East Regional Investigations Group will form a pilot and link to wider local law enforcement. This has been agreed with that region and is in place.

The new FFCL Strategic Advisory Board should have a dotted-line link into the Joint Fraud Taskforce, which will give access to the main players in local law enforcement.

There is further detail on this in the Delivery Plan Annex with a diagram that outlines how operational issues may flow upwards. The new FFCL regional operational group should be initially chaired by one of the local authority experts from the FFCL Strategic Advisory Board.

Organising ourselves

– a collaborative governance model

Local authorities involved in the workshops realised the need for a strategic board and were pleased that the FFCL board had been in place since 2010 with oversight and had stood the test of time. It was also noted that the board had changed in role several times as had the membership. The original board had been very active, the second board had been more of an oversight body and the current board was wider but less visible. Attendees at workshops raised questions regarding the governance of FFCL, the route for selection to the board and the seniority and expertise of the board.

Further detail is included in the Delivery Plan Annex.

Attendees appreciated the support from the firms and private sector and did not object in any way to these board members. In particular, the rebuilt secretariat and the support for the conference and awards in 2019 were noted, as was Mazars’ free support on toolkits.

Recommendation: It is recommended that a review of governance takes place in respect of the role of the current board in light of the FFCL regional operational group and links to the Joint Fraud Taskforce.

Further recommendations are detailed in the Delivery Plan Annex.
Fighting Fraud and Corruption Locally
A strategy for the 2020s

Case Study
The first social care fraud prosecuted by Veritau and City of York Council

Veritau investigated following a referral from a member of the public. This is the first prosecution of a social care fraud by the council’s legal department and an area of development for the counter fraud team. Several prosecutions for social care fraud have been achieved before, but these were jointly investigated by the police and taken to court by the Crown Prosecution Service.

The defendant was the financial representative for his mother who received social care support funded by City of York Council. The council funded his mother’s social care, and he failed to inform them when his parents’ property sold in 2014. He subsequently lied about this on a financial assessment form. The £86,000 has been paid back to the council in full. Information was received that his parents’ property had been sold in 2014 for £200,000 and he had not declared this to the council in an attempt to avoid paying for his mother’s care fees. The investigation found that on two separate occasions in 2015 he informed the council that his parents were still joint owners of the property and that his father lived there. In a financial assessment for social care funding, jointly owned properties are disregarded if a family member continues to live there.

The counter fraud team worked alongside financial investigators from the council’s trading standards team, who were able to obtain financial information which showed that £198,000 from the house sale was deposited into the son’s bank account. This money should have been taken into account for his mother’s social care funds, meaning that the council would not have had to pay £86,000 out of the public purse. As a result of the two teams working together, the man was billed and the entire loss has now been repaid to the council.

He pleaded guilty to two charges of fraud by false representation at York Magistrates’ Court on 8 October 2019. The case was referred to York Crown Court for sentencing on 19 November where he received a 20-month suspended sentence and was ordered to do 80 hours of unpaid work. He was also ordered to pay court costs of over £1,100 and an £80 victim surcharge. When sentencing, the judge said that a significant factor in mitigation was that he had already repaid the £86,000 to the council.

e) Fraud risk areas

The research has highlighted the following types of fraud risks. These frauds are expanded on in the companion documents and the list below is a brief description:

Fraud risks raised in the research

| Social care fraud: personal budgets and direct payments | overstatement of needs through false declaration, multiple claims across authorities, third party abuse by carer, family or organisation, posthumous continuation of claims |
| Schools | most issues that were raised in the workshops were also raised as issues for schools. This area did not feature in FFCL 2016 |
| Right to buy | fraudulent applications under the right to buy/acquire |
| Money laundering | exposure to suspect transactions |
| Commissioning of services | including joint commissioning, joint ventures, commercial services, third sector partnerships – conflicts of interest, collusion |
| Tenancy | fraudulent applications for housing or successions of tenancy, and subletting of the property |
| Procurement | tendering issues, split contracts, double invoicing |
| Payroll | false employees, overtime claims, expenses |
| Identity fraud | false identity/fictitious persons applying for services/payments |
| Council tax | discounts and exemptions, council tax support |
| Blue Badge | use of counterfeit/ altered badges, use when disabled person is not in the vehicle, use of a deceased person’s Blue Badge, badges issued to institutions being misused by employees |
| Grants | work not carried out, funds diverted, ineligibility not declared |
| Business rates | fraudulent applications for exemptions and reliefs, unlisted properties |
| Insurance fraud | false claims including slips and trips |
| Disabled facility grants | fraudulent applications for adaptations to homes aimed at the disabled |
“Fraud has not disappeared: it is ever present, evolving and affects the funding that is needed for frontline services. In many public sector bodies it is still an area where there is significant underinvestment, because they are not recognising the extent of the epidemic and seeing other priorities, particularly around service delivery, as more important. As fraudsters evolve, we must too. To these ends, through collaboration and intelligence sharing with a fraud prevention specialist service, we are ensuring that cases of fraud are not replicated across our partnership, mitigating controls are put in place and offenders are dealt with appropriately. Through our proactive intelligence-led approach we are taking steps to ensure the public purse is protected from all fraudulent activity.”

David Hill, Chief Executive South West Audit Partnership

Concessionary travel schemes – use of concession by ineligible person, including freedom passes
No recourse to public funds – fraudulent claims of eligibility
New responsibilities – areas that have transferred to local authority responsibility
Local Enterprise Partnerships – partnerships between local authorities and businesses. Procurement fraud, grant fraud. All LEPs should now be incorporated, with a local authority as accountable body, in a more formal and regulated relationship. Key issues are LEP governance, procedures for allocating/prioritising grants
Immigration – including sham marriages. False entitlement to services and payments
Cyber-dependent crime and cyber-enabled fraud – enables a range of fraud types resulting in diversion of funds, creation of false applications for services and payments.

However, during the research for this strategy it has become clear that some frauds have become more prevalent and that some risks have reduced. In addition, fraud risks were raised at several workshops about money laundering, suspicious activity reports and risks attached to local authorities becoming more commercial.

The details of these risks are included in the companions as these are seen as changing areas that may need frequent updating.

While the direct consequences of fraud may be financial and reputational loss there are wider impacts that surround the harm to victims locally and the harm in the community. Local authorities have raised a number of issues about protecting the vulnerable from fraud and this spans a large area. There are also other stakeholders in this local landscape who offer support to victims, have developed networks and done deeper research. A large number of volunteers have come forward from the workshops with good practice and a willingness to collaborate to prevent and tackle these issues. The main fraud risk area that has drawn attention is social care fraud. However, there are other frauds that may merit scrutiny.

Activity
Local authorities have agreed to form a working group to look at the area of social care fraud. A number of ideas have been put together and the group will consider these, what further activity is required and if any wider work can be done.

Economic Crime Plan 2019

Economic crime touches virtually all aspects of society. Economic crimes range across the full breadth of criminality, ranging from low-level frauds through to sophisticated cyber-enabled market manipulation. Fraud is now the second most common crime type in England and Wales, with nearly every individual, organisation and type of business vulnerable to fraudsters.
f) Counter Fraud Capacity, Competence and Capability

In FFCL 2016 themes were identified in the areas of capacity, competence and capability as part of the 6Cs – see page 23. These issues still exist.

Despite the challenge around capacity, competence and capability and lack of dedicated resource it is clear that activities to tackle fraud across the sector are being pursued and having a positive impact. But demand and growth in the number of incidents of fraud reported nationally mean local authorities must focus on areas of fraud that they identify as posing greatest risk and adverse impact on their organisations and the vulnerable. Working collaboratively and sharing resources should be encouraged and the FFCL regional board should undertake an analysis of which local authorities may benefit from support and how this might happen.

Many local authority practitioners reported that their capacity to tackle fraud and corruption had been reduced as a result of austerity-related local authority funding reductions. In addition several workshops were attended by shared service representatives and reported that non-attendees no longer had counter fraud resources. In one workshop it was noted that eight councils did not have any resource but that a colleague in the revenue department of a neighbouring authority had been ‘helping out’ across them. There are also situations that require collaboration: for example, a district council pursues council tax and business rates fraud, but the main beneficiaries are the county council and the Government.

In many cases practitioners also reported that some of the skilled investigation resource had been transferred to the Department for Work and Pensions and had not been replaced. There were large disparities in respect of numbers of staff and skills.

Local authorities reported that their staff did not always have the skills or training to tackle fraud and corruption. Many attendees were skilled and qualified. It was also clear that because a number of local authorities did not have access to a team they were not covering the full range of fraud activities. In contrast the workshops were well attended by experts who, while overloaded, were attempting to tackle all frauds but with one hand behind their backs. Very often they said they would be pleased to assist neighbouring councils but had no contact or requests. The FFCL regional board may assist with this and what support can be given.

In addition there were some parts of the country where the teams were not up to date with current local landscape issues or activities that would benefit them in their roles. At the FFCL 2019 conference questions were raised about free access to tools and good practice and it was agreed to hold this in the Knowledge Hub, which is an independent, free tool that many local authorities already use. In addition some local authorities already have small networks in the Knowledge Hub that they could link to the FFCL pages. The Knowledge Hub has been open for FFCL since the summer and now contains the archive documents as well as details about other current issues.

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**Adult care services successful prosecution and repayment in full of fraud loss**

The subject of this investigation was the husband of a Hertfordshire County Council service user in receipt of financial support to pay for daily care. He completed the financial assessment forms on behalf of his wife but failed to declare ownership of residential property that was rented out in the private sector.

The allegation originated from a social worker who had a ‘gut feeling’ that the couple had a second home and referred to matter to Herts’ shared anti-fraud service.

The investigation found that the couple jointly owned three properties in addition to their residential home. All three properties were rented out and held equity.

The husband was interviewed under caution where he accepted ownership of the properties but denied any wrongdoing, stating that there was no capital in any of the additional homes and that he had been struggling financially since his wife became ill. As part of the enquiries conducted by the team a fourth property was identified abroad.

On 1 July 2019 at Luton Crown Court, he pleaded guilty to all three counts of fraud by false representation. He was sentenced to two years in prison, suspended for two years. The judge adjourned any financial sanction until the confiscation order was completed. A service decision was made in that had the financial assessment form been completed correctly and the additional property declared, the service user would have been deemed a self-funder and received no financial support for care. Therefore the loss to HCC was calculated as £75,713 and a future saving of £1,166 per week (£60,632 per year) was recorded.

The loss including interest was calculated to be £89,141, which he has paid in full.
Some local authority practitioners reported that senior managers were finding it difficult to dedicate sufficient time to demonstrate their support for counter fraud activities due to a focus on other priorities such as meeting budget savings targets and maintaining key services to residents.

This was considered to have a negative effect upon performance, and was associated with counter fraud work having a low profile and the benefits of counter fraud work not being fully appreciated. Appendix 1 details what senior officers and members should focus on.

There is reluctance in some cases to report identified fraud, for example in press releases, for fear of presenting a negative impression of an authority. Reporting of successful outcomes is a powerful tool in prevention and deterrence.

It is important to embed a counter fraud culture and this requires a focus and leadership from the top. This requires having an appropriate resource in place. There is a role for the audit committee to challenge activity, understand what counter fraud activity can comprise and link with the various national reviews of public audit and accountability.

Local authority practitioners demonstrated an appetite for working more formally across local authority boundaries and with other agencies, departments and the private sector. They reported a range of difficulties in securing progress to working together.

Examples included counter fraud work not being consistently prioritised across the sector, lack of financial incentives to make the business case to collaborate, local lack of understanding of data protection rules, and lack of funding.

They also reported an appetite for innovative use of data and wider data sharing, but had encountered barriers to this or made very slow progress.

Local authorities further reported that they found it hard to get the police involved in their cases and that they did not receive feedback on cases from crime reporting hotlines.

During the research a number of incidents were highlighted that demonstrated patterns of activity, organised fraud and money laundering. These issues have been acted upon. However, it is important that local authorities have access to routes where they can report these matters. Local authorities are the eyes and ears of the community and have a wealth of data that can help other local law enforcement if legally
accessed but this communication is not happening everywhere. This collaboration would support the fight against serious and organised crime. If the recommendations about links between the operational board and the JFT are agreed this will start to resolve some of the issues in this section.

**Recommendations:**
- The external auditor should highlight FFCL and its appendices to the audit committee in the annual report.
- The regional network should continue use the Knowledge Hub as a free, independent, non-commercial confidential space to share information. When it is live the secretariat should hand it to the FFCL operational board.
- Local authorities should partner with neighbours and engage in regional networks and should consider sharing resources and expertise. The FFCL operational board should take the lead on this.

While this strategy covers fraud and corruption, no instances of corruption were raised at the workshops though it was clearly considered alongside fraud in local strategies. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government has conducted research on procurement fraud and corruption that will be added to the live FFCL documents.

“Working in partnership has allowed the Veritau member councils to establish a dedicated corporate fraud team. The team offers each council access to fraud investigators with specialist knowledge of the fraud risks facing local government. The team has also helped each council to recover significant fraud losses, particularly in new and emerging areas like adult social care.”

*Max Thomas, Managing Director Veritau*

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**Case Study**
**Devon Audit Partnership**

A social housing local landlord alleged that Mr P was potentially subletting his property illegally to an unentitled third party. Mr P was already in the process of applying for the right to buy his social housing property.

The subsequent investigation revealed evidence that Mr P’s friend was subletting the property from him and had been for at least two years. It also confirmed that Mr P was living in a private rented property with his girlfriend less than two miles away.

Mr P constantly denied the allegations. However, at his interview under caution with the DAP counter fraud services team, after repeatedly lying, he admitted the overwhelming evidence proved he was letting his friend live at his social housing property but denied that he had done anything wrong.

Mr P was subsequently prosecuted and pleaded guilty at that point to two offences contrary to:

- Prevention of Social Housing Fraud Act 2013 – in relation to the dishonest illegal sublet of a social housing property
- Fraud Act 2006 – in relation to the dishonest attempt to fraudulently obtain a £39,600 discount on his right to buy.

Mr P was sentenced to 160 hours’ unpaid work for each charge and ordered to pay Plymouth City Council £750 towards its costs. Judge Darlow stated at the end of the case: “It was fraud [and] the decision by Plymouth City Council to prosecute is to be applauded.”
Section 2: The Strategic Approach

To support the delivery of the strategy there is a need for an action plan, appropriate governance arrangements and revised structures to underpin the key requirements to foster and improve collaboration across boundaries.

The recommendations contained in this strategy need to be turned into a set of achievable actions that are properly resourced, timetabled and allocated to appropriate local and national partners. These will need to be supported by an advisory board of senior stakeholders that commands widespread support and leadership across all levels of local government. This should include the Local Government Association and the relevant central government departments.

New structures, appropriate to the changing demands, need to be constructed to support the delivery of the strategy. It is recommended that these are built upon the existing counter fraud arrangements already paid for by local government, and that the resources of the existing and new structures are committed to supporting the delivery of this strategy.

The key principles are laid out in the pillars and themes:

**GOVERN**
- Having robust arrangements and executive support to ensure anti-fraud, bribery and corruption measures are embedded throughout the organisation.

**ACKNOWLEDGE**
- Accessing and understanding fraud risks.
- Committing the right support and tackling fraud and corruption.
- Demonstrating that it has a robust anti-fraud response.
- Communicating the risks to those charged with Governance.

**PREVENT**
- Making the best use of information and technology.
- Enhancing fraud controls and processes.
- Developing a more effective anti-fraud culture.
- Communicating its' activity and successes.

**PURSUE**
- Prioritise fraud recovery and use of civil sanctions.
- Developing capability and capacity to punish offenders.
- Collaborating across geographical and sectoral boundaries.
- Learning lessons and closing the gaps.

**PROTECTING ITSELF AND ITS RESIDENTS**
- Recognising the harm that fraud can cause in the community.
- Protecting itself and its' residents from fraud.
Govern
The bedrock of the strategy is that those who are charged with governance support the activity by ensuring that there are robust arrangements and executive support to ensure counter fraud, bribery and corruption measures are embedded throughout the organisation. Beating fraud is everyone’s business. The internal arrangements that are put in place should be communicated throughout the organisation and publicly available to demonstrate the culture and commitment to preventing fraud.

Without exception the research revealed an ‘ask’ that those charged with governance be directed to the strategy and that this become a key element. During the research for FFL 2011 and 2016 it was requested that some key points be laid out for those charged with governance in local authorities to make it simple for them to ensure fraud was being tackled. This request was repeated on numerous occasions during the workshops for FFCL 2020. Some basic questions are laid out at the end of the strategy in Appendix 1.

The supplements to this strategy lay out some key stakeholders, their roles and the areas that they should consider when evaluating the counter fraud efforts in their organisations.

The pillar of ‘govern’ sits before ‘acknowledge’. It is about ensuring the tone from the top and should be included in local counter fraud strategies.

Acknowledge
In order to create a counter fraud response an organisation must acknowledge and understand fraud risks and then demonstrate this by committing the right support and appropriate resource to tackling fraud.

This means undertaking a risk assessment of fraud areas and vulnerabilities and then agreeing an appropriate resource. Not every local authority requires a large team but they should have assessed the risk, have a plan to address it and have access to resources with the right capabilities and skills.

Prevent
Fraud can be prevented and detected by making better use of information and technology, enhancing fraud controls and processes and developing a more effective anti-fraud culture.

Local authorities should set in place controls to prevent fraudsters from accessing services and becoming employees. It is nearly always more cost-effective to prevent fraud than to suffer the losses or investigate after the event.

The technology to establish identity, check documents and cross-check records is becoming cheaper and more widely used. Controls should apply to potential employees as well as service users. If someone lies about their employment history to obtain a job they are dishonest and it may not be appropriate to entrust them with public funds. In any case they may not have the training or qualifications to perform the job to the required standard.

Case Study
Fraud Hub Hertfordshire County Council

Hertfordshire County Council and a number of its neighbouring authorities are taking the next step to protect themselves by sharing intelligence in a newly formed FraudHub from the National Fraud Initiative to ensure they can reveal the full extent of fraudulent activities within their region.

Results so far have been extremely positive for Hertfordshire with over...

• 3,000 Blue Badges cancelled
• 3,000 concessionary travel passes being revoked
• 120 LG pensions or deferred pensions stopped
• 182 Direct Payments or personal budgets for adult care being stopped/reduced or reviewed
• 15 residential care placements being cancelled
• 23 payroll discrepancies being subject to further investigation
• 50,000 customer records removed from database alone using mortality data
• More than £5m in estimated savings in its first 12 months
The council investigated following an anonymous tipoff that the tenant of a council property was not using the address as required by their tenancy and was profiting from the short-term letting of the property using Airbnb.

Searches of Airbnb carried out by the investigator found the property, which is a studio flat, advertised as a whole property with over 300 reviews. The council investigator found that even though the listing was not in the tenant’s name, some of the reviews mentioned the tenant by his name, thanking him for his advice and local restaurant recommendations.

The council obtained the tenant’s bank statements under the provisions of the Prevention of Social Housing Fraud Act using the authorised officer service provided by the National Anti-Fraud Network. The investigator subsequently found credits totalling over £125,000 covering four years.

All payments were credited from Airbnb, PayPal or Worldpay. When investigators visited the property they found a man at the premises who denied being the tenant even though his appearance matched the tenant’s description. The next day the adverts had been removed from Airbnb but the investigator had already retrieved and saved copies. The tenant failed to attend several interviews under caution, but when possession action began his solicitors asked for a further opportunity for their client to be interviewed under caution to provide an account of events. This was agreed but again the tenant failed to attend the interview.

Having applied the Code for Crown Prosecutors to the facts of the case and the defendant’s personal circumstances, criminal action was not taken.

At the possession hearing, the District Judge said the Airbnb evidence was strong and that there was no distinction between ‘short-term let’ and subletting the home. The judge found in favour of the council. At an unsuccessful appeal hearing the judge agreed to the council’s unlawful profits order of £100,974.94 – one of the highest that has ever been awarded to the council.

The tenant has now been evicted from the property.
Durham County Council’s counter fraud and corruption team has embedded many of the themes to create a robust approach. They have set up partnerships across sectors and regions, created a data hub and used the FFCL strategy to inform all of their work. The audit committee has supported the team and attended the FFCL awards in 2019.

DCC believes the best defence is to create a strong anti-fraud culture based on zero tolerance to deter fraud from being committed. It has reinforced this with a new corporate fraud sanction policy.

Norwich City Council adopted the FFCL pillars into its anti-fraud and bribery strategy in 2017 with the additional pillars of governance (similar to the NHS model). This has had a positive response from council executives and members including the audit committee. The annual report contains a RAG-rated review against the criteria set out in the local strategy and an activity plan based on the criteria each year to demonstrate progress and highlight areas to focus on.

A more detailed explanation of these is in the Annexes.

The Themes – Six Cs

The live companions to this strategy document set out more information on how local authorities can ensure that their counter fraud response is comprehensive and effective. In the 2016 Strategy six themes were identified and during the research the workshop attendees were keen that these remain part of the strategy document.

Local authorities should consider their performance at a minimum against each of the six themes that emerged from the research conducted. To ensure this is effective and proportionate local authorities should benchmark this information where possible.

The themes are:

Culture – creating a culture where fraud and corruption are unacceptable and that is measurable

Capability – assessing the full range of fraud risks and ensuring that the range of counter fraud measures deployed is appropriate

Capacity – deploying the right level of resources to deal with the level of fraud risk that is monitored by those charged with governance

Competence – having the right skills and standards commensurate with the full range of counter fraud and corruption activity

Communication – raising awareness internally and externally, deterring fraudsters, sharing information, celebrating successes

Collaboration – working together across internal and external boundaries: with colleagues, with other local authorities, and with other agencies; sharing resources, skills and learning, good practice and innovation, and information.

Making the business case:

Investing in counter fraud activity –

Local authorities should pursue opportunities to invest in counter fraud and corruption activity in order to generate savings by preventing and recovering losses.
Local authorities do not, as a rule, explicitly budget for fraud losses (the exception to this is housing benefit, where subsidy losses are budgeted for). However, estimates of local authority losses demonstrate that there is a significant problem, and therefore a significant opportunity for local authorities.

Local authorities should seek to assess their potential losses and measure actual losses in order to make the business case for investing in prevention and detection. In many cases there is an existing business case based upon the experience of other local authorities. For example, the prevention and detection of fraud perpetrated in income areas such as council tax is now widespread and offers higher tax revenue which can be recovered through existing, efficient collection systems. However, each local authority will need to make its own case as fraud risks will vary significantly depending on location, scope, and scale of activities.

The moral case – fraud and corruption in local authorities are unacceptable crimes that attack funds meant for public services or public assets.

The result is that those in genuine need are deprived of vital services. Fraud and corruption are often linked with other criminal offences such as money laundering and drug dealing. Local authorities have a duty to protect the public purse and ensure that every penny of their funding is spent on providing local services. More often than not, in doing so they achieve wider benefits for the community. For example, adult social care sits within the precept for council tax and reducing fraud in this area means that taxpayers’ money is protected and is an incentive.

**Case Study**

An interim manager hired vehicles for personal use covering at least nine different vehicles and costing more than £18,000. The fraud included various invoice frauds for gardening services and over £20,700 paid to the interim manager’s account.

In total the interim manager’s actions resulted in monies, goods or services with a total value of £60,882.16 being ordered or obtained at a cost to the council from seven suppliers, including false invoices purporting to be from a gardening company.

Thirty-one fraudulent invoices were introduced by the interim manager totalling over £48,000 and were processed, authorised and paid using the council’s systems. A further eight invoices totalling more than £7,000 were subsequently authorised by the interim manager’s line manager for liabilities incurred by the interim manager. Employee purchase cards were used to pay for goods worth over £1,270 and the interim manager personally benefited by £4,000 from the compensation payment and over £20,780 from the fraudulent invoices he submitted from the gardening company.

The fraud was discovered via a whistleblowing referral to audit services.

The council’s investigation found that the maintenance company with the same bank account as the interim manager’s company did not exist. The council’s audit services department led an investigation with the police to take the matter to Birmingham Crown Court where the interim manager pleaded guilty to Fraud Act offences. He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment on 25 September 2019.
Section 3: Turning Strategy into Action

The Delivery Plan
To support the delivery of the strategy there is a need for an action plan, appropriate governance arrangements and revised structures to underpin the key requirements and foster and improve collaboration across boundaries.

The set of recommendations contained in this strategy need to be turned into a set of achievable actions that are properly resourced, timetabled and allocated to appropriate local and national partners. These will need to be supported by an advisory board of senior stakeholders that commands widespread support across all levels of local government. This should include the Local Government Association and the relevant central government departments.

New structures, appropriate to the changing demands, need to be constructed to support the delivery of the strategy. It is recommended that these are built upon the existing counter fraud arrangements already paid for by local government, and that the resources of the existing and new structures are committed to supporting the delivery of this strategy.

Further details on governance and recommendations are in the Delivery Plan Annex.
Section 4: The Local Response

Appendix 1

What should senior stakeholders do?

The chief executive
1. Ensure that your authority is measuring itself against the checklist for FFCL
2. Is there a trained counter fraud resource in your organisation or do you have access to one?
3. Is the audit committee receiving regular reports on the work of those leading on fraud and is the external auditor aware of this?

The section 151 officer
1. Is there a portfolio holder who has fraud within their remit?
2. Is the head of internal audit or counter fraud assessing resources and capability?
3. Do they have sufficient internal unfettered access?
4. Do they produce a report on activity, success and future plans and are they measured on this?

The monitoring officer
1. Are members, audit committees and portfolio leads aware of counter fraud activity and is training available to them?
2. Is the fraud team independent of process and does it produce reports to relevant committees that are scrutinised by members?

The audit committee
1. Should receive a report at least once a year on the counter fraud activity which includes proactive and reactive work
2. Should receive a report from the fraud leads on how resource is being allocated, whether it covers all areas of fraud risk and where those fraud risks are measured
3. Should be aware that the relevant portfolio holder is up to date and understands the activity being undertaken to counter fraud
4. Should support proactive counter fraud activity
5. Should challenge activity, be aware of what counter fraud activity can comprise and link with the various national reviews of public audit and accountability.

The portfolio lead
Receives a regular report that includes information, progress and barriers on:

- The assessment against the FFCL checklist
- Fraud risk assessment and horizon scanning

Appendix 2

FFCL Checklist

- The local authority has made a proper assessment of its fraud and corruption risks, has an action plan to deal with them and regularly reports to its senior Board and its members.
- The local authority has undertaken a fraud risk assessment against the risks and has also undertaken horizon scanning of future potential fraud and corruption risks. This assessment includes the understanding of the harm that fraud may do in the community.
- There is an annual report to the audit committee, or equivalent detailed assessment, to compare against FFCL 2020 and this checklist.
- The relevant portfolio holder has been briefed on the fraud risks and mitigation
- The audit committee supports counter fraud work and challenges the level of activity to ensure it is appropriate in terms of fraud risk and resources
- There is a counter fraud and corruption strategy applying to all aspects of the local authority’s business which has been communicated throughout the local authority and acknowledged by those charged with governance.
- The local authority has arrangements in place that are designed to promote and ensure probity and propriety in the conduct of its business.
- The risks of fraud and corruption are specifically considered in the local authority’s overall risk management process.
- Counter fraud staff are consulted to fraud-proof new policies, strategies and initiatives across departments and this is reported upon to committee.
- Successful cases of proven fraud/corruption are routinely publicised to raise awareness.
- The local authority has put in place arrangements to prevent and detect fraud and corruption and a mechanism for ensuring that this is effective and is reported to committee.
- The local authority has put in place arrangements for monitoring compliance with standards of conduct across the local authority covering:
  - codes of conduct including behaviour for counter fraud, anti-bribery and corruption
  - register of interests
  - register of gifts and hospitality
- The local authority undertakes recruitment vetting of staff prior to employment by risk assessing posts and undertaking the checks recommended
in FFCL 2020 to prevent potentially dishonest employees from being appointed.

• Members and staff are aware of the need to make appropriate disclosures of gifts, hospitality and business. This is checked by auditors and reported to committee.

• There is a programme of work to ensure a strong counter fraud culture across all departments and delivery agents led by counter fraud experts.

• There is an independent and up-to-date whistleblowing policy which is monitored for take-up and can show that suspicions have been acted upon without internal pressure.

• Contractors and third parties sign up to the whistleblowing policy and there is evidence of this. There should be no discrimination against whistleblowers.

• Fraud resources are assessed proportionately to the risk the local authority faces and are adequately resourced.

• There is an annual fraud plan which is agreed by committee and reflects resources mapped to risks and arrangements for reporting outcomes. This plan covers all areas of the local authority’s business and includes activities undertaken by contractors and third parties or voluntary sector activities.

• Statistics are kept and reported by the fraud team which cover all areas of activity and outcomes.

• Fraud officers have unfettered access to premises and documents for the purposes of counter fraud investigation.

• There is a programme to publicise fraud and corruption cases internally and externally which is positive and endorsed by the council’s communications team.

• All allegations of fraud and corruption are risk assessed.

• The fraud and corruption response plan covers all areas of counter fraud work:
  – prevention
  – detection
  – investigation
  – sanctions
  – redress

• The fraud response plan is linked to the audit plan and is communicated to senior management and members.

• Asset recovery and civil recovery are considered in all cases.

• There is a zero tolerance approach to fraud and corruption that is defined and monitored and which is always reported to committee.

• There is a programme of proactive counter fraud work which covers risks identified in assessment.

• The counter fraud team works jointly with other enforcement agencies and encourages a corporate approach and co-location of enforcement activity.

• The local authority shares data across its own departments and between other enforcement agencies.

• Prevention measures and projects are undertaken using data analytics where possible.

• The counter fraud team has registered with the Knowledge Hub so it has access to directories and other tools.

• The counter fraud team has access to the FFCL regional network.

There are professionally trained and accredited staff for counter fraud work. If auditors undertake counter fraud work they too must be trained in this area.

The counter fraud team has adequate knowledge in all areas of the local authority or is trained in these areas.

The counter fraud team has access (through partnership/ other local authorities/or funds to buy in) to specialist staff for:
  – surveillance
  – computer forensics
  – asset recovery
  – financial investigations.

Weaknesses revealed by instances of proven fraud and corruption are scrutinised carefully and fed back to departments to fraud-proof systems.

Section 4

The Fighting fraud and Corruption Locally board would like to thank

The Fighting Fraud and Corruption Locally board is:

Charlie Adan – Chief Executive and SOLACE
Bevis Ingram – LGA
Andrew Hyatt – Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea
Mike Haley – Cifas and Joint Fraud Taskforce
Rachael Tiffen – Cifas and secretariat
Suki Binjal - Lawyers in Local Government
Colin Sharpe – Leicester City Council
Clive Palfreyman – LB Hounslow
Trevor Scott – Wealden District Council
Alison Morris – MHCLG
Mark Astley – NAPN
Paula Clowes – Essex County Council
Simon Bleckley – Warrington Council
Karen Murray – Mazars
Paul Dossett – Grant Thornton
Marc McAuley – Cipfa

The Board would like to thank Cifas for managing this process, for the delivery of the research and the drafting of this document.
Regional Workshops

Around 260 councils attended workshops organised in the following areas:

- East Anglia
- South West, Devon, Plymouth, Cornwall and Devon
- Kent
- London and the South East
- Essex
- Hertfordshire and Home Counties
- Midlands Fraud Group and Chief Internal Auditors and County Networks
- North West Fraud Groups
- Yorkshire Groups
- North East and North Regional Fraud Group

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Section 5

Glossary and documents

- NAFN – National Anti-Fraud Network
- CIPFA – Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy
- Cifas – UK’s fraud prevention service
- NECC – National Economic Crime Centre
- NCA – National Crime Agency
- MHCLG – Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government

ONS: www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales/yearendingseptember2019#fraud


National Fraud Authority, Annual Fraud Indicator, March 2013

National Fraud Authority - Good practice publication: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/agencies-public-bodies/nafn/our-work/


Local Government Association Counter Fraud Hub: www.local.gov.uk/counter-fraud-hub

Veritau: veritau.co.uk/aboutus

SWAP Internal Audit Services: www.swapaudit.co.uk

Devon Audit Partnership: www.devonaudit.gov.uk